
Introduction

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“Si, se puede!” (Yes, we can!), chanted the hundreds of thousands of immigrants and their native-born supporters who marched through American cities and in front of the Capitol in Washington, D.C., in the spring of 2006. Appropriating the chant once popularized by protesting farmworkers, the marchers—many of them Latino but Asians and Europeans as well—campaigning for a reformed immigration policy that would allow undocumented newcomers to remain in the United States and to one day become citizens. A sea of American flags left the clear impression that those who had come, however they had gotten to the United States, wanted to stay. Despite a deadlocked Congress, including a House of Representatives demanding legislation that would brand undocumented aliens as felons who should be arrested and prosecuted, the protesters still believed that tomorrow in the United States must be better than today in Mexico, the Philippines, El Salvador, Honduras, Vietnam, or Ireland.¹

Such optimism hardly characterized the attitude of all migrants around the Atlantic community. In France, protests against a law facilitating the firing of laborers by their employers especially drew the ire of the many thousands of young Muslim workers who had migrated for jobs, found few, and now despaired of ever enjoying the security and opportunity that had lured them from their homes in North Africa or the Middle East. Less than a year earlier, in England, despair was translated into self-destruction.² On July 5, 2005, four young men from Leeds, England, three of them born to middle-class Pakistan parents in Britain and the fourth of them from Jamaica, went to London and blew themselves up on three trains and a double-decker bus. Asked his reaction, a twenty-two-year-old Muslim in Leeds commented, “I don’t approve of what [they] did, but I understand it. You get driven to something like this; it doesn’t just happen.” A few days

later, a *New York Times* reporter compared Muslim experiences in Leeds with those of Muslims in the New York metropolitan area. In the former, extensive unemployment, lack of job skills, and uncompleted education both reflected and compounded the years of mistreatment of South Asians in a formerly largely homogeneous nation. Abuse and discrimination had left many of these newcomers feeling marginalized, frustrated, and alienated to the point of embracing the violence advocated by radical Islamists. Throughout human history violence has been the voice of desperation. No longer did these young men believe what Muslims in New York and immigrant marchers in the streets of America did, that they could experience incorporation into their host society.³

While the attention of scholars and policy makers in host nations has been primarily focused on the pushes and pulls of migration, and especially on definitions of borders and boundaries and the legal implications of crossing them, some scholars and policy makers have turned their attention to postmigration phenomena. In the United States those who study migration and those who debate legislation are already attending to the challenges facing newcomers and their hosts as migrants are integrated into American society and culture. As during previous migrations, scholars are already examining how today's new arrivals negotiate their place in American society with native-born Americans.

Because we live in a global age that has been fashioned by new technologies of transportation and communication, the incorporation process is somewhat different than in earlier eras, yet there is also much that remains the same. For example, recent congressional debates over whether English should be made the official language of the United States reflect the anxieties of some Americans that their culture and tradition will be insufficiently durable to withstand the stress of new transportation and communication technologies. Can a nation that has had immigration policies but never an immigrant policy, especially one that speaks to the issue of language, successfully integrate the millions of newcomers currently arriving? How will this process proceed? While the technologies may alter the process, the underlying anxieties experienced by newcomers and natives are hardly new.

Indeed, much of the contemporary debate over the integration or assimilation of newcomers into American society prompts a sense of *déjà vu*. Mass immigration to the United States began before the Civil War, when 4.5 million newcomers arrived between 1840 and 1860, most of them having originated in the nations of northern and western Europe, espe-

cially Ireland, the German states, and Scandinavia, with a smaller number from China. While that pattern persisted after the war as well, still more newcomers began arriving from other donor nations. Between 1880 and the 1920s, over thirty million migrants made their way to America's shores. Now an increasing number of migrants left southern and eastern Europe, Canada, China, Japan, Canada, and Mexico for the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, and Brazil. If the migrants were heterogeneous, so were the scholars studying them. Examination of this fresh stream of migrants was interdisciplinary in character.

In an era when historians had just begun to professionalize and break from the notion that the past should be left to talented amateurs such as George Bancroft, the leading students of immigration often came from the ranks of social scientists, such as Robert Park, Louis Wirth, William I. Thomas, and Florian Znaniecki at the University of Chicago. These members of the "Chicago School" brought the insights of sociology, economics, political science, and anthropology to their endeavors. Others, such as Jane Addams, Lillian Wald, and Jacob Riis, were urban reformers of a Progressive bent who saw comprehension of migration and migrants as essential to achieving their broader reform agenda that included urban and industrial change.

Some social scientists at universities and reformers at urban settlement houses were dubious, or guardedly optimistic at best, about the inclusion of immigrants in American society. They dubbed the newcomers of their era the "new immigrants" to distinguish them from those "old immigrants" who had arrived from northern and western Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century and whom the social scientists and reformers looked upon as better prepared for life in the United States than more recent arrivals. Sociologist Peter Roberts, author of the 1912 study *The New Immigration: A Study of the Industrial and Social Life of Southeastern Europeans in America*, advocated the rapid assimilation of newcomers. He told his readers, "I believe in the immigrant. He has in him the making of an American, provided a sympathetic hand guides him and smooths the path which leads to assimilation."⁴ Others could not have disagreed more. In 1914, Wisconsin sociologist E. A. Ross published *The Old World in the New*. He concluded that "subcommon" immigrants arriving in the United States might actually cripple the American population if permitted unrestricted entry. He contended that "from ten to twenty percent are hirsute, low-browed, big-faced persons of obviously low mentality. . . . These oxlike men are descendants of those who always stayed behind."⁵ Nor did Ross

prove to be an exception. Madison Grant's *The Passing of the Great Race* (1916) synthesized many nativist arguments into a masterful and widely read volume on the superiority of hereditary over environmental factors in shaping mankind. Grant filtered his data through his own biases. The incorporation of the foreign born would be risky, he believed, because the resulting race mixing would produce a hybrid race that reverted to a "more ancient, generalized and lower type."⁶ The lowest type among the immigrants, East European Jews, seemed to Grant both the antithesis of the tall, fair Nordic type he most admired and a likely drain on the vitality of the superior Anglo-Saxon race, which they were bound to undermine over time if they were allowed entry and intermarriage.

As early as 1911, Columbia University anthropologist Franz Boas, himself a German Jewish immigrant, published *The Mind of Primitive Man*, a refutation of the arguments posed by those who regarded the foreign born as racially inferior and inassimilable.⁷ In one series of experiments, Boas demonstrated that the American environment had modified the very "racial characteristics" that nativists found so objectionable in new arrivals. Because the slope of the cranium had often been regarded as a reliable index of race, he measured the skulls of second-generation immigrants and discovered that many no longer physically resembled their parents. Long-headed types grew shorter and round-headed types often developed elongated heads. Boas concluded that nutrition and other aspects of living conditions determined these "racial characteristics" more than heredity.⁸ He had little doubt that given the opportunity immigrants could be integrated into American society. Though Boas was acclaimed in the scientific community, he was unsuccessful in changing most other anthropologists' views regarding the usefulness of race as an analytic category. Not until 1938 was he able to persuade the American Anthropological Society to pass a resolution defining terms such as *Aryan* and *Semite* as having "no racial significance whatsoever."⁹ As historian Eric Goldstein observes, later anthropologists such as Ruth Benedict and Ashley Montagu continued Boas's work and questioned whether the term *race* was applicable to European groups, while terms such as *ethnicity*, "pioneered by Jewish scholars in the 1920s," were increasingly applied to "European descent groups."¹⁰ Neither Boas nor his acolytes ever convinced all lay readers that race was not a useful category to apply to the newcomers of the early twentieth century or that most immigrants could ever be successfully integrated into American society. Not until 1998, ninety-six years after its founding, did the American Anthropological Association find race a useless analytic cat-

egory, stating that “‘race’ . . . evolved as a worldview, a body of prejudgments that distorts our ideas about human differences and group behavior. Racial beliefs constitute myths about the diversity in the human species and about the abilities and behavior of people homogenized into ‘racial’ categories.”¹¹

Like most anthropologists at the turn of the century, such American historians as Herbert Baxter Adams attributed the greatness of the United States to racial superiority, especially the superiority of the Teutonic race, tracing American democracy to the tribes of the great German rain forests. Adams feared that the newcomers of his era were incapable of preserving the gift of America’s Teutonic heritage.¹² Other historians such as Frederick Jackson Turner observed the newcomers firsthand. In 1901, he wrote a series of newspaper articles filled with the stereotypes and clichés of the era. He found Italians “quick-witted and supple in morals.” Jews he knew to be “thrifty to disgracefulness, while their ability to drive a bargain amounts to genius.”¹³ Still, Turner had faith in the American environment to transform new arrivals. He hailed the western frontier as a beneficent force for homogenization, believing that the diversity of stocks “with their different habits, morals and religious doctrines and ideals . . . led to cross-fertilization and the evolution of a profoundly modified society.”¹⁴ He also realized the need for more scholarly treatment of immigration.

Of Turner’s students, only Marcus Lee Hansen recognized that the peopling of America began in Europe and that historians should understand why some left and others stayed as well as why America seemed so attractive to immigrants. Hansen had little doubt of the ability of newcomers to be incorporated into American society, to the benefit of both the newcomers and their hosts.¹⁵ A quarter of a century later, Oscar Handlin’s *The Uprooted* would begin the modern study of the newcomers who had arrived at the turn of the century. Although later scholars criticized the volume for its exaggerations and imprecision, Handlin’s almost poetic description of European peasants seeking better lives in the New World made clear his belief that immigrants could and would be incorporated into American life.¹⁶

Today, the subject of incorporation continues to provide grist for the scholarly mills of both social scientists and historians as they address the experiences of more recent migrants.¹⁷ Social scientists looking at the contemporary immigrations are tackling a dazzling array of topics, issues, and groups. They have a particularly complicated chore given the sheer diversity of immigrants coming to the United States since the 1970s. Historians

looking back to the earlier part of the twentieth century and to centuries past basically had a smaller range to consider. Their subjects primarily came from Europe, with those from different European regions coming during fairly specific decades. They also had to be cognizant of the very small migrations of the Chinese, Japanese, and Indians, as well as the trickle from the West Indies and Mexico. Additionally, we know after decades of scholarship by historians that most immigrant groups in the past tended to come from a particular class, those who had little economic stake in the places they left but who were not so poor as to be unable to finance an oceanic immigration and ply their skills in a new economy.

Since the 1970s, however, peoples from the entire world have begun to migrate to the United States, and sociologists, anthropologists, economists, demographers, and political scientists confront an America that draws in immigrants from every continent and every country within those continents, and, to a great extent, at the same point in time (or in overlapping periods). Since the passage of the Hart-Cellar Act in 1965, women and men from all over the world have sought to enter the United States. Millions have done so legally and millions have done so outside legal channels. Millions more aspire to do so. This new migration has drawn to the United States people from Central America, South America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Mexico in particular has sent millions to the United States, and it has become a major staging ground for potential immigrants from other parts of Central America. In addition the last three decades of the twentieth century and the first of the twenty-first found Europeans on the move again. Immigrants from some countries with long histories of American-bound migration, Ireland and Italy in particular, also took advantage of the new policies. Immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Poland found their way to the United States too, while various regions of the Balkans that experienced major ethnic upheavals in the wake of the fall of communism likewise sent their daughters and sons to America during these recent decades.

In addition, social scientists have shown us that the newest immigrants to America are much more economically diverse than previous waves. They include within their ranks the most educated and the least, some of the best off in their homelands and some of the worst off. Immigrants from the Indian subcontinent, the Philippines, and various nations of the Caribbean have included nurses and doctors, scientists, and high-level employees of global corporations. They also have included poorer women and men who have taken some of the lowest-paying jobs in the service

economy. This disjunction has left its mark, anthropologists and sociologists have shown, on the kinds of community practices developing in the newest ethnic enclaves.

Furthermore, contemporary immigrants have fanned out to more regions and states than previous immigrants have. Mexican immigrants can be found, and studied, not just in California and the Southwest but also in North Carolina and New York. They have in addition planted their communities in suburbs more frequently than in the old urban neighborhoods, although they have shown up there as well. That too has made for a greater complexity among today's immigrants than among those in the past and has complicated the project of social scientists seeking to study immigration as an on-the-ground phenomenon.

In some cases these groups found small ethnic communities already in existence that they could relate to and depend upon. In other cases, the post-Hart-Cellar immigrants functioned as the pioneers, building their ethnic enclaves from scratch. Some of the contemporary immigrants came to America and found their friends and relatives, their "co-nationals" who had already learned how to negotiate American realities, political, cultural, and economic, and who shared this knowledge with the newcomers. Others, the newest of the new immigrants, had to go through the learning process on their own. All in all, the vast heterogeneity of places from which contemporary immigrants have been drawn, the tremendous differences between them and among them, place the project of contemporary social science analysts in a category far different from what historians of the "old" immigration have confronted.

In addition, most past researchers treated an era in which American law played a minor part in shaping immigrant life and ethnic incorporation. Not so contemporary analysts. They are examining an era in which they cannot disassociate migration and ethnic community formation from the complex legal and administrative system that leaves its mark on family and community life. In essence, to do contemporary analysis requires deep knowledge of the workings of the American legal system, given its profound impact upon the immigrants and their American negotiations.

Historians tend to not see the particular challenges facing their colleagues in the social sciences. They mostly believe that contemporary social scientists, when studying migration and incorporation, neglect the historical dimension. They would prefer that social scientists acknowledge that the phenomena they identify in the present have often appeared before. Historians, too, use the term *incorporation* as they look back upon

earlier eras of migration. Consumed with studying phenomena over broad stretches of time in specific geographic locations, hesitating to overgeneralize or engage in model building, historians prefer instead to attend to the specificities of the cases they study.

Yet, when not engaged in methodological wars, social scientists and historians can offer complementary perspectives on migration, ethnicity, and incorporation in a global age. Sociologists and cultural anthropologists describe familiar patterns of chain migration, in which new arrivals follow their friends and relatives to areas of settlement in the host country. Historians test the model by observing how new arrivals from China or India gravitate to preexisting communities of settlement and rely upon family and friends for jobs and assistance during postmigration periods of adjustment, just as East European Jews did in 1910. Social scientists accept ethnicity as a construct that blurs unique national identities, while historians explain how Mexicans, Cubans, and Nicaraguans submerge differences and embrace a common Latino identity after migration to the United States, even as workers from the different regions of southern Italy accepted a common Italian identity in an earlier migration era. And social scientists describe contemporary patterns of Asian and Latino incorporation by tracing occupational patterns, voting patterns, and marital patterns in the global world, even as historians offer examples of these patterns among the Poles, Greeks, or Japanese who arrived at the turn of the last century.

What portrait do these scholarly perspectives offer of today's migrants? In what ways does contemporary immigration differ from the migrations of the past? To what degree do the immigrants who began to arrive in the last decades of the twentieth century represent a more profound crisis for American society than those who left their homes in previous centuries? On the most profound level, the weight of evidence that can be gleaned from the corpus of work created by immigration scholars points to similarities outweighing differences and highlighting the extent to which differences function as matters of degree rather than kind.

Just as scholars of an earlier era conceptualized immigrants as either "old" or "new," depending upon when they arrived and from where they originated, there is a temptation to consider the experience of today's migrants in a binary framework: individuals migrate or remain in place; their hosts welcome them or reject them; newcomers are completely integrated into the host society or are transnational in perspective; migrants cling to home-country traditions and customs or embrace acculturation;

today's migrants experience migration differently from or similarly to those who arrived earlier.

The social scientists and historians who have contributed to this volume offer a far more complicated, nuanced perspective on migration and integration experiences. The migration experiences and the negotiations in which migrants engage as they find their place in American society today are neither completely different nor completely the same as those of individuals and groups who arrived at the turn of the last century. And just as scholars at the turn of the last century perceived profound differences between newcomers arriving in their era and the Irish, Germans, and Scandinavians who came midcentury, so many of today's scholars perceive a gulf between the Europeans—Italians, Russians, Jews, Greeks—of the early twentieth century and those migrants who came at the century's end, who often were not Christian or European, did not speak European languages, and seemed to share few social and cultural characteristics with Americans.

As for the whiteness or nonwhiteness of newcomers, such scholars as Alexander Saxton and David Roediger have redefined the concept of whiteness in relation to the power relationships that exist in American society at a given time. Historian Noel Ignatiev has observed that Irish immigrants who arrived in the middle of the nineteenth century were initially defined as nonwhite, while other scholars, such as Thomas Guglielmo and Karen Bodkin, have explained that later arrivals, as well, were initially defined as non-Caucasian.¹⁸ Perhaps no scholar has done more to explore the complexities of ethnic and racial labels with respect to migrants than Matthew Frye Jacobson in his 1998 volume, *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race*.¹⁹ More recently, David Roediger has described the 1920s and 1930s, just when restrictive immigration laws and procedures were being put in place, as the moment when migrant groups who had arrived in previous decades were being fully redefined and incorporated as part of white America.²⁰

What similarities and differences can we see between earlier migrations and the current migration, and their implications for American society? As for the act of migration itself, few contemporary scholars imagine a simplistic model of migration in which some individuals move elsewhere permanently and others remain. Migration, especially movement over long distances, oceans, and continents, remains one of several possible decisions made in response to economic and social pressures.²¹ Individuals and families calculated strategies to improve their lots in light of these

pressures. As John Bodnar and other scholars have observed, in an earlier era the pressures often resulted from larger changes taking place in the development of capitalist labor markets.²² Moreover, migrants thought in temporary, not permanent terms, with populations moving back and forth across boundaries for jobs and higher wages. In the early twentieth century, Italian laborers from the southern provinces were often characterized by American immigration officials as “birds of passage” because they sailed back and forth to countries in North and South America so often in response to seasonal labor needs.²³ Today, as well, migration patterns are fashioned from labor shortages and abundance. Mexican migrant laborers make semiannual appearances on the stage of American agriculture coinciding with planting and harvesting seasons. And just as newcomers of an earlier era followed family, friends, and compatriots in chain migration patterns, taking advantage of the economic and communal structures that others had fashioned, so, too, do today’s Latino and Asian newcomers. A century ago even migrants who intended to remain in their host countries returned to visit family back home, as did the Russian Jews fleeing poverty and Russian pogroms. So, too, contemporary immigrants make visits home, bringing consumer goods and remittances to poorer relatives in addition to the ones they send via mail. Arrivals, whether from Ireland in the 1850s or Guatemala in the 1990s, transformed “back home” even as they sought to draw away brothers, sisters, wives, and children by paying their passage to the United States.

Migration meant redefining identities from the moment of arrival, if not before.²⁴ Whether we focus our attention on women and men who came to the United States in 1900 from Calabria or in 2000 from the Yucatan, newcomers continued to maintain relationships with friends and family from home villages. Moreover, in their new home the Calabrians came to recast themselves as “Italians” and those from Yucatan as “Mexicans,” respectively, finding that they had much more in common with arrivals from Apulia or Sonora than they did with arrivals from Poland or India.

Migrants at the turn of the last century and now neither exclusively cling to the traditions of their homeland nor rush to embrace acculturation. They do both. At one and the same time they seek to preserve traditions, which anchor them in the world, and embrace what they see as cultural innovation, although they may do so cautiously. To succeed in their new home they embrace new cuisines and new styles of dress, language, worship, courtship, marriage, child rearing, and recreation, cobbling all of

these together into a collage of practices that inform their everyday lives. In the early twentieth century, groups arriving from southern and eastern Europe often arranged marriages for their children. However, in the factories, in the schools, and on the streets of the United States the youth of different groups met and mingled. Parents often faced the challenge of notions of romantic love that defied their authority and resulted in marriages that crossed religious, ethnic, and racial barriers. Cultural mediators, such as Abraham Cahan, editor of the Yiddish-language daily *Forward*, suggested that in America the matchmaker (*shadkan*) might be replaced by parks and beaches where “boy meets girl.” Increasingly generational conflict resulted in compromise and modification of marriage traditions, especially in the second generation.²⁵ Today as well, the negotiation over whom to marry and the customs of marriage take place as part of a broader negotiation. The *New York Times* marriage notices in August 2002 included the announcement of the wedding of Rakhi Dhanoa and Ranjeet Purewal, two Sikhs. Ms. Dhanoa, a twenty-seven-year-old immigration attorney employed by a New York law firm, is a first-generation American who, unbeknownst to her, became the focus of a Sikh matchmaker at the behest of the young lawyer’s mother. The matchmaker invited Ms. Dhanoa to her daughter’s graduation party, where she was introduced to Mr. Purewal, the eldest son of Punjabi immigrants, a handsome graduate of Rutgers University who worked as a recruiter for a New York head-hunting firm. The couple dated secretly to avoid parental meddling. Though well educated and modern in every way, the couple insisted upon a traditional Sikh wedding. Why? The bride observed that her family’s stability came largely from “religion and family,” adding, “When you are growing up as the first generation in America, it’s important to have that [traditional] identity.” A friend of the bride observed, “You can’t escape your ethnicity, so you just have to deal.”²⁶

Migration has always required the newcomers and the native born to negotiate their relationship. Would newcomers be welcomed or held at arm’s length? An immigrant aphorism translated into many languages was “America beckons but Americans repel.” Even as opportunity has drawn newcomers to the United States, Americans have often expressed reservations and erected barriers to incorporation. At the turn of the last century some opponents of immigration plumped for restrictions, believing that legislation would be the best way to exclude undesirable newcomers. Others sought to admit newcomers and then to transform them, to Americanize them. The latter included reformers such as Jane Addams, who

founded Hull House in Chicago, and Lillian Wald, the founder of New York's Henry Street Settlement. Through classes and by example, Addams, Wald, and others sought to transform migrants into middle-class Americans. They and others provided a comprehensive array of services including counseling, employment bureaus, and emergency relief to those in need of food, clothing, or shelter. Day care centers aided working mothers. Lillian Wald's Visiting Nurse Service brought medical care into the tenement apartments. Another source of assistance and philanthropy was derived from members of an ethnic group who had arrived in an earlier era. Organizations such as the Educational Alliance on New York's Lower East Side were supported by contributions from German Jewish philanthropists who sought to hasten the incorporation of newly arrived East European Jews at the turn of the last century. Similarly, the Italian Welfare League brought assistance to recent arrivals from those who had come years before. Assistance to Catholic newcomers in that era, including southern Italians or Poles, often came from Catholic charities or church coffers that had been nourished by the contributions of Irish Catholic philanthropists who had arrived years before.

At times settlement house workers practiced marked cultural sensitivity. While classes in cooking acquainted newcomers with American foods and patterns of eating, they fostered a culinary exchange. Settlement house workers encouraged immigrants to share their recipes. In Milwaukee, settlement workers helped their pupils compile family recipes from German, Russia, Poland, and elsewhere into the *Settlement Cook Book*, an exercise in cultural sharing. However, cultural faux pas sometimes happened too. Jane Addams recounted an episode that lost Hull House workers credibility in their community. A sick infant was abandoned on the front step of Hull House. In spite of the ministrations of a physician, the child died. When the Hull House workers prepared to have the child buried by the county, an angry crowd gathered in the largely Italian Catholic neighborhood, infuriated by the absence of a priest, and made arrangements to bury the child with religious rites. An embarrassed Addams later wrote, "It is doubtful whether Hull House has ever done anything which injured it so deeply in the minds of some of its neighbors. No one born and reared in the community could possibly have made a mistake like that. No one who has studied the ethical standards with any care could have bungled so completely."²⁷

Similarly, today there are those who would repel newcomers by passing restrictive legislation. Modern-day nativists such as Peter Brimelow advo-

cate reduction in the admission of legal immigrants as well as undocumented immigrants, arguing that immigrants have not been as beneficial to the economy as some have claimed but have proven to be considerably more problematic for the future of American culture than immigration advocates have allowed.²⁸ Others, such as Samuel Huntington, have suggested that particular groups, such as Latinos, are less assimilable than earlier groups.²⁹ At the same time, others see the newcomers as needing only culturally sensitive treatment to encourage and support their incorporation into American society on terms satisfactory to natives and newcomers alike. Often, the same sensitivity once extended to newcomers in settlement houses has been put into practice in contemporary institutions where newcomers seek culturally sensitive aid. One such place is the hospital or medical clinic. In an earlier era, physicians often attempted to force their definitions of health and therapy upon immigrants. However, more recently physicians, nurses, and hospital staff have come to realize that the most successful therapy often depends upon comprehending the role that culture plays in both disease and therapy, especially with respect to mental illness. At times, newly arrived Asian patients suffer from depression, anxiety, or schizophrenia, but some ailments are culture bound. *Pa-feng* is a phobic fear of wind and cold that occurs in Chinese patients. *Hwa-byung* is a suppressed anger syndrome found among Koreans. An increasing number of institutions employ physicians with the required cultural sensitivities to treat patients and train colleagues. In the Asian-American Family Clinic at Zucker Hillside Hospital in Queens, New York, an immigrant physician and former chaplain in the South Korean Army blends Zen Buddhism, Confucianism, and psychotherapy in treating patients, tailoring each therapy to the patients' culture.³⁰

These examples suggest that the immigration experiences of the past and present are not all that different. However, avoiding oversimplification requires acknowledging significant changes that have transformed migration and recast the experience of migrants. The most obvious differences concern communication and transportation between donor and host nations. Letters that traversed oceans in ships that took many days to make the journey have been replaced by speedy electronic communications, including telephone and more recently electronic mail linking migrants with those who remain at home.³¹ Parents and their children, neighbors, and friends need not wait to share thoughts, feelings, and experiences. The implications of such speed in maintaining or recasting human relationships are still being explored by scholars. So, too, are changes in transportation.

In an era of inexpensive air travel, the ease of round-trip journeys may well nurture a more extensive web of transnational relationships than the seasonal or long-term migrations possible in the early twentieth century. Newspapers report that international businessmen can begin the day in New York City, tend to their affairs over lunch in a Caribbean nation, and be home in time for a late supper.³² Dual residences and dual citizenship are becoming increasingly common aspects of such transnational patterns, challenging the very definition of international migration and its implications for “becoming American.”³³ Ever since the 1967 Supreme Court decision *Afroyim v. Rusk*, the United States has had to recognize dual citizenship.³⁴ We cannot know if the children or grandchildren of contemporary immigrants will enter American life more slowly than the children or grandchildren of earlier immigrants because they have grown up in an environment frequently suffused with the words and tastes of their ancestral homelands, but it is likely that the ability to maintain closer connections between places of residence and places of origin will have an impact.

Contemporary migrants face a web of regulatory policies and laws far more extensive than those that engaged migrants of an earlier era. Immigrants arriving in the United States during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with the exception of the Chinese, who were the first targets of restrictive legislation designed to exclude a particular ethnic or national group, faced few legal tests prior to arrival. Many achieved naturalization unencumbered by insurmountable legal obstacles. However, since the 1920s, government has been increasingly obstructionist. No longer is the obstacle an Ellis Island physician or Immigration Bureau interrogator. Today’s legal migrant faces a perplexing maze of preference categories, lotteries, and extensive forms. The erection of these legal hurdles has raised high the walls that divide “legal” from “illegal or undocumented” aliens. The ethnic enclaves where undocumented migrants live and work have been shaped by their presence, and the perspective of even legal migrants has been recast accordingly. Increasingly, legal immigrants equate the plight of the undocumented with their own anxieties about incorporation. Those who have nothing to fear become the advocates of those who live in daily fear of being discovered and deported. Families with children born on American soil to undocumented parents face daily risks of disruption.

On the other hand, today’s immigrants arrive in an American society that at least rhetorically celebrates “diversity” and “multiculturalism” far more than did American society at the turn of the last century. Current

law allows those who reside in the United States to be citizens of another country at the same time that they are American citizens and vote in both places. No longer does taking on American citizenship and participating in the American political process require a divorce from one's country of origin and the renunciation of older political ties and even property rights.

How, then, should social scientists and historians conceptualize what happens after migrants arrive in the United States? Such terms as *incorporation* and *assimilation* have been used to describe the postmigration process. Are they synonyms or do they describe quite different processes? Scholars tend to use the term *incorporation* to describe those actions taken by individual migrants and their families to bring them closer to the host society.³⁵ Groups do not incorporate, people do. Incorporation involves individuals engaging in ever-widening circles of contact and interaction with the host society, beginning with the workplace and emanating outward into a broad range of informal and less structured encounters in venues such as neighborhoods, schools, sport and recreation facilities, and religious institutions. If this process of incorporation proceeds without substantial resistance, it will eventually include membership in nonethnic organizations, citizenship and suffrage, and possibly social interactions that transcend group boundaries, such as dating and out-marriage.³⁶

Assimilation is a more thoroughgoing, two-way social process that requires not only the desire of a newly arrived group to incorporate into society but the consent and cooperation of host society members to accept the newcomers. Assimilation demands that newcomers increasingly abandon ethnic traditions and ethnic exclusivity. It also requires that members of other groups and especially those native to a society accept newcomers as equals in a broad range of encounters, including access to avenues of mobility, influence, and even political power. Segmented assimilation involves access and acceptance into a particular stratum of society often defined by race or religion. Thus West Indian migrants of dark complexion often find that they may achieve assimilation only in the African American community and not in the broader society, where racism remains an obstacle. Some scholars, such as historian Elliott Barkan, contend that incorporation embraces such other social processes as acculturation, adaptation, and integration and is an element of the larger, more comprehensive assimilation process.³⁷

As contemporary scholars investigate how incorporation is actually operating in the twenty-first century, they have become increasingly aware

that social boundaries once seemingly insurmountable are increasingly permeable, or at least negotiable. A number of factors are responsible for the changing face of incorporation. First, incorporation is far more gendered than it was in earlier eras. As an increasing number of women, whether single or married, have acquired education and entered the workforce, more of them engage in activities that promote incorporation in the public sphere. Second, incorporation and assimilation may take longer than scholars and policy makers anticipate. Evidence suggests that second- and third-generation migrants continue to display behavior promoting incorporation. Although patterns differ from group to group, transnational lives may inhibit rather than promote rapid incorporation and assimilation. Third, incorporation patterns tend to be uneven among groups and within a given group. Recency of arrival, age, gender, education, linguistic aptitude, occupation, religion, place of settlement, and preexisting biases of the host society are just some of the variables that may influence the pace of incorporation and its progress toward assimilation. Fourth, incorporation has been redefined to eliminate the notion that it requires the complete shedding of earlier identities as well as all customs and cultural patterns defining a migrant group as different from the host society.³⁸ This modification of an older notion requiring complete abandonment of the past has been encouraged by a fifth factor, an enhanced toleration of diversity and pluralism in the United States. Increasing acceptance of diversity encourages integration of minorities into American society without requiring that a group's customs, identities, and even prior national allegiances be immediately and thoroughly abandoned, as was often the case in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Finally, incorporation has been dramatically transformed by the realities of globalization. High-speed communications, travel, and trade have combined to shrink the globe. No longer does confining citizenship to a single nation-state or restricting economic transfers among individuals residing in different sectors of the globe seem prudent or even possible. As historian Peter Kivisto observes, "No adequate theory of assimilation can be developed that does not account for globalization."³⁹ The same appears to hold for incorporation. Transnational travel, the transfer of remittances across border and boundaries, and many other interactions routine in a global environment redefine but never exclude the possibility of a group's incorporation into a host society or even its eventual assimilation, processes that continue beyond the generation that made the initial move from one location to another.

The process of integration is worth close scholarly examination, although it is hardly unprecedented. Earlier migrants, too, sought to maintain homeland ties and retain cultural, religious, political, and historical affiliations with those who stayed behind, at least until their homelands achieved independence and were transformed or until the pressures of U.S. immigration laws prevailed in cutting individuals off from faraway friends and relatives.⁴⁰ As historian Reed Ueda suggests, in the 1920s immigration policy in the United States became a “device for social engineering.” A “racially restrictive naturalization policy” by which “the state [could constrict] the boundary of American nationality” resulted in a sharp constriction of opportunities for incorporation and assimilation. Americans temporarily seemed to lose their faith in the power of their economy, culture, and political institutions to make aliens Americans. The cost of incorporation seemed too high and the risks appeared daunting.⁴¹ The expansiveness of an earlier era was canceled by restrictive legislation and later in the 1930s by administrative procedures that accomplished the same ends.⁴²

Following World War II, Americans reassessed their reservations about ethnic pluralism. Beginning in 1965, reform in American immigration law reflected the attitudinal shift. In subsequent decades the result echoed new demographic realities as admissions soared from Asia (Southeast, South, and West Asia), Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa. The end of the Cold War opened the spigot so that East Europeans could join the flow. Some scholars contend that the civil rights movement and feminist movement promoted an expansiveness and revision of social values and attitudes and legitimized and institutionalized the multicultural ethos that encouraged the incorporation of the foreign born. The historian Reed Ueda observes that the federal government, having deployed immigration laws to discourage immigrants’ incorporation, now adopted liberal policies and offered an invitation to enter and join the American enterprise. Ueda contends that the 1965 legislation restored “the central role of immigration” and “the cosmopolitan belief in the capacity of all individuals for membership in the American nation,” thereby enabling their incorporation into every aspect of American society.⁴³ The change prompted various groups and communities in the United States to reassess their own boundaries, offering greater opportunity for the social and cultural incorporation of newcomers than ever before. If the 1965 legislation in part shaped a civic culture that was more open to newcomers than the civic culture of earlier eras, this reevaluation of the border and boundaries

separating natives and newcomers was echoed in the nation's economic, religious, educational, and political institutions, according to Ueda.

Historian Mae M. Ngai agrees that the quota system of the 1920s created a pernicious division among newcomers. Legal and illegal categories often corresponded to racial differences. While migrants of color were included in the labor force that the United States continued to import, they were often excluded legally in a manner that deprived them of rights and citizenship. However, unlike Ueda, Ngai does not find that the Immigration Act of 1965, the Hart-Cellar Act, was a catalyst for immediate improvement in the status of all migrants. While those who had been the main target of the 1924 legislation, southern and eastern Europeans, now benefited, as did migrants from Africa and Asia, those migrating from Mexico, the Caribbean, and Latin America were severely affected by the law's initial hemispheric ceiling and increased attention to border control. Ngai concludes that, increasingly, illegal immigration was blamed on Mexicans, a problem that could be solved only by rigorous law enforcement.⁴⁴

Ngai and others observe that not until the late 1960s and 1970s did assertions of Black Power, Brown Power, Asian-American Power, and a host of smaller ethnic heritage movements begin to meet with some success.⁴⁵ Efforts in the Latino and Asian communities to assert greater political power on behalf of their groups were fueled by the increasing number of new arrivals. From the mid-1960s to early 2005, more than twenty-six million newcomers arrived legally and an estimated additional eleven million arrivals came undocumented.⁴⁶ Because of these increasing numbers, newcomers who naturalized could assert power at the ballot box, while all could assert power in the American marketplace as workers and consumers. This power was enhanced by the maintenance of homeland connections permitted by rapid communications and low-cost, speedy transportation. Transnational relationships enhanced the power of migrants, especially because of the way remittances forged financial connections with families and communities remaining in the donor countries. By 2004 remittances from the United States alone had reached \$32 billion and were significant sources of national revenue for such countries as the Philippines, El Salvador, and Mexico. So many countries have recognized the importance of these transnational relationships to their welfare that approximately one hundred have granted their nationals the right of dual citizenship—urging them to become American citizens while retaining their original nationality.⁴⁷ Although the United States does not formally

recognize dual citizenship, ever since *Afroyim v. Rusk* the federal government has accepted limitations of the grounds upon which citizens could be denaturalized. For the most part, citizens must explicitly renounce their United States citizenship in order to be legally divested of it. Thus migrants can potentially exert political as well as economic power in donor and host nations.

While the potential power seemingly accessible to international migrants at the dawn of the twenty-first century appears formidable, the reality may be less so. Some scholars argue that most migrants maintain only limited, intermittent, or episodic ties with their country of origin and former neighbors, a modest relationship that one scholar has labeled “translocalism.”⁴⁸ Thus, while Colombians and Dominicans often campaign and vote in homeland elections and Mexicans offer financial assistance to improve service and infrastructure to their villages via hometown clubs, others barely keep touch with the relatives and friends who remained behind. Sociologist Alejandro Portes observes that “not all immigrants are transnationals.” Indeed, “regular involvement in transnational activities characterizes only a minority of immigrants and . . . even occasional involvement is not a universal practice.”⁴⁹

As scholars continue to tangle over the definitions and scope of such terms as *incorporation*, *assimilation*, *transnationalism*, *translocalism*, and *globalism*, there is a growing consensus that these terms do not define mutually exclusive relationships. Within migrant groups from the Hmong to Mexicans these processes often occur simultaneously. Moreover, identity issues, citizenship choices, destinations, gender roles, residential preferences, occupational roles, educational objectives, organizational affiliations, legal status, political participation, and even intermarriage collectively embody an ongoing negotiation between aliens and the United States that has been perennial in American history, long preceding the current wave of migration.

And what of the native born? Public opinion research suggests that Americans do not disapprove of immigration and incorporation patterns nearly as much as Americans did in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁵⁰ At least some of the credit for the diminished opposition to immigration is the direct result of statements by American presidents and other leaders suggesting that newcomers who arrived in the United States legally are not responsible for diminished security or diminished economic opportunity for the native born. In the midst of the turmoil after the attack upon New York City and Washington, D.C., by radical Islamists,

President George W. Bush sought to curb American nativism by urging Americans not to blame all Muslims for what a radical minority had done, a far cry from President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's failure, in the 1940s, to prevent the internment of West Coast Japanese in the face of a national security crisis. While the current debate over immigration policy often waxes passionate, angry critics of current policy most often focus their ire upon America's porous borders and inconsistent policies toward temporary workers and undocumented aliens.

Newspaper reports suggest the almost daily dilemmas and uncertainties confronting those seeking to become part of American society. The *Los Angeles Times* reported the story of four young Mexican Americans who participated in a high school science fair in Arizona and were rewarded for their fine project with a trip to Niagara Falls. Coming back from the Canadian side, they were detained as illegal aliens because as youngsters, ranging in age from two to seven years old, they had been brought into the country by their parents. Their teachers and school principal came to their defense, and in July 2005 the federal government's case against the young men—all four of whom now either were in college or had graduated and were applying for citizenship—was tossed out by a judge. A *Times* editorial applauded the judge's "sensible step blocking their deportation."⁵¹ Why? The extent of incorporation by these four young men proved more compelling to the judge than the government's argument that as illegals they must be deported, whatever their circumstances or accomplishments.

Today as at the turn of the last century, the study of migration is an interdisciplinary endeavor. The objective of this collection of articles by eminent scholars is to offer readers an interdisciplinary perspective on the compelling issues confronting migrants to the United States and their hosts. Five disciplines are represented by those participating in this anthology. Our objective is the incorporation of such scholars from diverse disciplinary backgrounds into the shared territory of migration studies. Included in this collection are the essays of five historians (Gary Gerstle, Paul Spickard, Barbara Posadas, Roland Guyotte, and Timothy Meagher), six sociologists (Roger Waldinger, Karen Woodrow-Lafeld, Min Zhou, Xiyuan Li, Mehdi Bozorgmehr, and Anny Bakalian), two anthropologists (Caroline Brettell and David Haines), and two economists (Barry Chiswick and Paul Miller).

By 2005, more than thirty-five million legal and illegal migrants were present in the United States. At different rates and with differing degrees of difficulty most will become incorporated into American society and

culture. Some may assimilate, or their children may, as sociologists Richard Alba and Victor Nee predict, although they see racism continuing to set boundaries on the process.⁵² Others will resist or fail to negotiate the changes required in going from one society to another. Scholars want to understand the process both from the perspective of the migrant and from the perspectives of the societies they are leaving and joining. How is the United States changing even as it requires change from those who come here? It is probably too early for a conclusive analysis, though scholars and journalists are often split between those who embrace the notion that diversity enriches American society and those who believe for various reasons that diversity degrades American culture and that the current newcomers are simply unassimilable in ways that earlier generations of newcomers were not. Still others echo the perennial fear that immigration is harmful to the American economy, especially to the interest of American workers.⁵³ As historian Mae Ngai observes, “In the globalized world of the early twenty-first century, when national borders have softened to encourage the movement of capital, information, manufactured goods, and cultural products, the persistence of hardened nationalist immigration policy would seem to demand our attention and critique.”⁵⁴ Those who joined in the marches of 2006 would agree, and many would remind Americans that in an ever-shrinking “global village” the United States is unlikely to escape continuing to be a nation of nations, numbering among its citizens women and men with contacts, connections, and knowledge of other cultures and other places.

The eleven essays in this collection provide invaluable perspectives on the challenges of incorporation by newcomers into American society in many parts of the nation—and, by inference, patterns of integration in other diverse societies in this age of ever-greater globalization. The themes include policies and formal procedures of legal inclusion; economic entrepreneurialism that becomes a different avenue for learning about America; newcomers measuring their adaptation by negotiating how much of their traditions to hold on to; immigrants discovering both the benefits and drawbacks for their adaptation of relying too heavily on an ethnic enclave; bonding among immigrant spouses (in many cases those in mixed marriages) as a means of coping and also providing networks for adjusting to their new homeland; and language schools and public media with ethnic emphases that both influence perceptions by immigrant/ethnic group members about their own heritage and culture and have a potential impact on responses to, and from, mainstream society.

Two essays provide longer historical perspectives of events during the twentieth century that, we can now see, provided precedents for Americans' periodic fears about foreigners and the perception of threats that they might represent, especially since September 11, 2001. Those perceived threats seem more ominous the more different the newcomers are when compared with American society and culture. Unavoidably, those perceptions have shaped and reshaped the conditions under which such newcomers have been welcomed or shunned by Americans. Finally, to a significant degree, incorporation into American society is profoundly affected by an array of intervening variables that include, on the macro level, government domestic policies, global geopolitical conditions, and U.S. relations with sending countries, and, on the micro level, the degree of attachment immigrants preserve with their home countries, bonds that are often seen by outsiders as far stronger, more persistent, and more prevalent than is often the case. Rather than a widespread transnationalism, we frequently see signs of translocalism—moderate ties that soften as newcomers move out of their communities and into the larger society (or into other groups) and as American-born generations arrive.

David Haines tackles the important feature of nation-state controls over the admission of newcomers, in this case refugee policies. Sovereign nations determine whom they will (legally) admit, under what conditions, and with what limitations and controls. Ultimately, policies focusing on the specific class of special admissions—refugees and asylees—can affect their incorporation into American society and their experience of the boundaries they may or may not encounter, for borders may represent impassable boundaries for some and more passable ones for others. Haines begins with a summary of the tragic events surrounding the German Jewish passengers on the *S.S. St. Louis* in the spring of 1939. They had registered for American visas and now desperately sought to avoid being returned to Germany because their admission numbers had not yet come up. The absence of any real refugee policy, combined with an unsympathetic public and a State Department riven by anti-Semitism, doomed their chances. Historically, Haines observes, “Those refugees with strong constituencies have fared better.”

In American refugee policies, the “moral commitments” to respond affirmatively have been based on applicants' class, ethnicity, race, religion, gender, age, and previous ties with the United States and on America's current relations with their homeland governments. Most of the nearly four million refugee admissions since 1945 were linked to anticom-

munism, and most others to a sense of American personal responsibility due to U.S. involvement in their homelands. A third component, reflecting the new sense of moral commitments, has been the nation's shift to a willingness to take a fair share of refugees as part of broader international efforts. A fourth has been, especially since 1980, a commitment to aid those who have been persecuted or are at risk of persecution. Haines then examines data related to measurement of refugee incorporation, specifically employment and perceptions of self-sufficiency, illustrating not only the complexities of incorporating such newcomers but also the difficulties of measuring how successful that effort has been. Ambivalence about refugee admissions periodically resurfaces, as we see in the last essays of the collection.

Long overlooked by immigration scholars who have focused on the causes of immigration and modes of newcomer adjustment, the propensity to seek U.S. citizenship is actually an important indicator of immigrant incorporation and commitment to the new host society. Karen Woodrow-Lafield is one of a small number of scholars now concentrating on the question of who applies for citizenship, how rapidly, and as a consequence of what variables. National origin is a vitally important factor related to political incorporation, as are gender and the visa category under which one was first admitted, especially the latter. Woodrow-Lafield analyzes provisions for admission to the United States, how the categories of those entering are connected to the likelihood of seeking U.S. citizenship, and how rapidly immigrants apply upon becoming eligible to do so. For example, the motives for citizenship do vary, and the emphasis in immigration law on family reunification certainly has had a bearing for many who do petition for it as a means of hastening the admission of immediate relatives.

The increasing percentage of nonimmigrant persons already residing in the country who adjust their status to permanent resident and then more rapidly petition for citizenship understandably suggests that some elements of incorporation are present earlier for such persons, including language competence, education, occupation, and familiarity with American principles and political institutions. Length of time in the country before applying is similarly often related to the likely degree of incorporation and is significantly linked, for many nationalities, to the percentage who have already been naturalized. Finally, the broader political context in terms of prevailing policies and public sentiments regarding immigrants also influences the decisions immigrants make in this regard.

A critical figure in easing the integration of newcomers into American society is the ethnic entrepreneur, according to anthropologist Caroline Brettell. In an age of globalism, ethnic entrepreneurs do far more than create economic opportunities for others of their ethnic group or offer familiar goods to their customers. Brettell suggests that they transmit the values of American society to newcomers while they encourage migrants' integration into their adopted society and culture. In return for brokering the integration of newcomers, ethnic entrepreneurs who distribute patronage to newer arrivals cultivate new customers and a reservoir of goodwill that translates into popularity and profits. Observing that anthropologists often speak of the economy as "embedded in society" and configured by a particular social system's political and social constraints, Brettell deploys the work of other social scientists to demonstrate how immigrant entrepreneurship is culturally and socially embedded in an ethnic community, with the community more than the entrepreneur being the unit of her analysis.

Although Brettell acknowledges the importance of gateway cities, such as Los Angeles, New York, Miami, and Chicago, for the contemporary immigrant story, she turns to a tier of slightly smaller metropolitan areas that have recently become more ethnically diverse than ever because of migration. In this study her laboratory is the Dallas–Fort Worth area. She focuses upon the Asian Indians in that metropolitan area, a residentially dispersed population including a substantial number of talented, well-educated individuals. With a ready market, an Indian entrepreneur who had been working in a Houston grocery store in Houston moved to Dallas to open his own grocery, the Taj Mahal. His imagination and energy paid off in a successful business catering to Indian tastes, and soon other Asian Indian businesses moved into the same shopping mall where the grocery was located. Once discovered, the mall became a magnet for the Indian community in a five-state area. Many found their way to the Chaat Corner, a fast-food bar at the back of the store. However, for Caroline Brettell the most significant development was that Asian Indians flocked to the Chaat Corner for far more than food. It soon became a locus of migrant activity, where newcomers met old friends; others planned community events and sold tickets; and still others posted fliers about concerts. And for a modest monthly fee other Asian entrepreneurs left stacks of their business cards.

The Taj facilitated not only buying and selling but also the dissemination of information, promotion of interaction, and preservation of cultural practices. Cultural citizenship was nurtured among Asian Indians as

they were kept connected to their home culture, their traditions, in the case of Hindus their faith, and such culturally embedded economic practices as bargaining and trust in business dealings. Brettell offers the Taj Mahal in Dallas–Fort Worth as an example of how in a global environment local marketing and consumption in an ethnic population can yield profits for entrepreneurs, while their business establishments and practices assist in maintaining cultural boundaries, practices, and ancient traditions at the same time as these newcomers adapt to the unlikely environment of American suburban communities.

Retaining ethnic identity even as they pursue integration into American society has always been a formidable task for newcomers to the United States. Moreover, the task varies considerably by ethnic group and the size of the community in the United States where the new arrivals take up residence. In their chapter “Filipino Families in the Land of Lincoln,” historians Barbara M. Posadas and Roland L. Guyotte analyze this process not as it occurs in a large metropolitan area but as it occurs in a midsized American community in the Midwest, Springfield, Illinois, the sixteenth president’s birthplace. Concerned with the role that ethnic organizations play in encouraging ethnic identity retention among midwestern Filipinos, the authors focus especially on the roles played by Springfield’s women of Filipino heritage (Filipinas) in determining the content of Filipino ethnic identity and marking the Filipino community’s boundaries, which include some and not others.

How did Springfield acquire a Filipino community in the first place? Posadas and Guyotte explain that between 1965 and 1974 approximately nine thousand physicians trained in the Philippines were welcomed into the United States. Some of these physicians and their families, Roman Catholic in religion, established an upper-middle-class enclave in Springfield. There, they educated their children and formed a variety of ethnic organizations to assist families in retaining Filipino identity even as they economically prospered and became respected members of the Springfield community. By the 1990s, a new cohort of Filipinas arrived from the Philippines. These were often the so-called pen pal brides. Some met husbands who worked at U.S. airbases on the islands; others first met their mates through letters or over the Internet. However they met their husbands, these newly arrived Filipinas were frequently quite different from those who had preceded them. They often tended to be younger and less well educated, to have less command of English, and to be of a lower socioeconomic class.

Citing the cases of specific Filipinas, some of whom they themselves interviewed, Posadas and Guyotte observe that the social distance among the Filipinas who arrived in different eras and were from different backgrounds could be bridged if the new arrivals articulated and modeled a gendered devotion to family and religion—usually Catholicism—that echoed the values of the earlier wave of migrants. However, Filipinas were not incorporated but were excluded if they failed to meet social and religious norms. In one case, for example, community members shunned a Filipina, whom they had initially supported when she left the battering American spouse who had brought her to Springfield, after they learned that she had had an affair with her unmarried divorce attorney and when she later became the mistress of a married automobile dealer. Thus the challenges of incorporation can extend beyond the boundaries of mainstream society to include the dynamics of integration and acceptance within the immigrant/ethnic communities themselves.

Barry Chiswick and Paul Miller bring another approach to the question of how newcomers adapt to their new environments and what can facilitate their incorporation. Together, various components of social and human capital—networks of family and friends and personal skills and experiences—and where one enters the country play critical roles in how well the newcomer fits in and the extent to which he or she relies upon the ethnic community in efforts to adapt to a new host society. Chiswick and Miller propose the term *ethnic goods* to encompass the goods and services that are sought by immigrants in their ethnic communities and that are “not shared with the host population or with members of other groups.” Such “goods” as the language spoken, clothing, foods, religious services, ethnic schools, and access to potential marriage partners also become more available and, in many instances, less costly the larger the enclave is. That in turn draws more newcomers to the ethnic enclave.

Affected by the presence of such “goods” and social networks is the immigrants’ likelihood of accepting lower wages in the enclave, in part because the availability of such “ethnic goods” there is believed to offset the lower income. In other words, not having such goods and services readily available would mean having to pay more to obtain them. Consequently, employment away from such an ethnic enclave would be appealing only if the income were great enough to outweigh being distanced from that community. Consequently, the incorporation of newcomers can be aided by the availability of the networks and the accessibility of such desired goods and services. On the other hand, the more skills, education, lan-

guage competence, and experience one has, the easier it is to be more distant from the immigrant/ethnic enclave and yet begin the processes of incorporation into the mainstream society. Moreover, because the enclaves are functional in the ways enumerated, they frequently do persist beyond the immigrant generation.

To test the effects of the enclave, Chiswick and Miller use census data to analyze English-language proficiency and earnings. Offsetting the benefits of the ethnic goods somewhat is the finding that those concentrated in such communities tend to have lower English-language abilities and that lower earnings are associated with concentration in enclaves and with limited language abilities. In the short run, it would appear that these enclaves do affect immigrants' incorporation into the mainstream society, at least until language skills are acquired, and that, usually, once newcomers leave the enclave their opportunities for more income do improve, in part because of their greater competency in English.

Historian Paul Spickard reminds us that scholars who treat migration and ethnicity in the United States often neglect the roles that religion and race, respectively, have played in shaping the experience of immigrants, especially their incorporation into American society. He is troubled that, with few exceptions, treatments of earlier migrations in scholarly books and museum exhibits have not adequately analyzed and presented the influence of race and religion in shaping the experience of newcomers as they have other economic or social variables. He laments that the significance of religion and race amply demonstrated in the "fine historical studies of Asians and Latinos" over the past twenty years have often not been deployed by scholars who write about Caucasian newcomers.

Certainly earlier scholars interested in the notion of assimilation offered theories about the roles of religion and race. Spickard cites the still provocative work of Will Herberg in *Protestant, Catholic, Jew* as an example of an assimilation theorist's argument that American religions were following a path similar to that of many newcomers, discarding dimensions of their institutional identities that smacked of foreignness as they joined the American cultural mainstream. Herberg did not address race, but sociologist Milton Gordon did, finding most people of color so "epiphenomenal," in Spickard's words, as to not throw doubt on the formulaic pattern of assimilation that Gordon envisioned. Even the recent "race-conscious scholarship" by Richard Alba and Victor Nee seems to Spickard insufficiently sensitive to the racial dynamics that Spickard sees as distinctive and determinist in eliminating the assimilation into the

American mainstream that was a possibility in the past pattern of Caucasian migrants.

Spickard's contribution to the ongoing dialogue over patterns of incorporation is a discussion of how religious identities have been framed in racial categories and how racial divisions in the American population have affected the identities of religious groups and their relationships in the broader sphere of denominational relations. Relying upon his considerable research and general expertise on Asian groups, Spickard focuses largely, but not exclusively, upon the Japanese American experience, offering several categories of discussion of this intersection of race and religion, including "institutions, leaders, lived religion, and racialization."

Spickard observes that Asian churches and other religious institutions reinforce ethnic identities. In Seattle, the Seattle Buddhist Church, the Japanese Methodist Church, the Japanese Baptist Church, and many others are centers of Japanese community activity as much as they are vehicles for religious worship. Spickard emphasizes the often overlooked but powerful role of religious leaders in preserving ethnic identity and shaping the incorporation process in the United States. In addition to leadership, Spickard notes that Korean American Protestant churches are not just places for worship service but also places where members "speak Korean and eat Korean food together." For a similar effect Spickard notes that Japanese with home altars, *butsudans*, often reported feeling an enhanced sense of their Japanese ethnicity as well as piety as Buddhists.

Finally, Spickard contends that religious identities have often been racialized. He offers as an example the manner in which American religious organizations often reach out to Buddhist churches in a spirit of religious fellowship and diversity because they regard them as by definition "foreign" and therefore in need of special treatment, no matter how many members might be native born or even non-Asian. Concisely, Spickard concludes, with respect to incorporation, "Religion matters. Race matters."

Few issues loom larger in discussions of immigration and ethnicity, past or present, than language. Two key aspects of language have long informed discussions about immigration, ethnicity, relationships within the immigrant community, and importantly the nature of the linkages between the generations. Language has, on the one hand, served as a profound element in the life of the group, both a real and a symbolic example of the differences between being a member of an immigrant community and not. On the other hand, the language of the host society has been one of the most powerful, pervasive aspects of the new land, demanding com-

petence of newcomers so that they might navigate the streets and the various new institutions. In this respect, perhaps no place has been as distinctive as the United States in terms of the expectation that immigrants eventually learn English.

Min Zhou and Xiyuan Li offer here an important window through which to see the various problems and issues raised by the language question. They focus on language maintenance among Chinese immigrants and their progeny in the United States, and they ask how the leaders of the immigrant communities have provided, and still provide, language instruction for youngsters born and raised in America, with its demand for English. Min Zhou and Xiyuan Li, despite not being historians, have shown how important it is to historicize contemporary concerns.

To understand the nature of the Chinese-language schools that predominate in Chinese enclaves at the beginning of the twenty-first century, they tell us convincingly, it is necessary to look back to the Chinese-language schools that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth. In the past, they show, community leaders created Chinese-language schools to make it possible for the youth to some day return home or be able to function in the ethnic enclave. Present-day Chinese-language schools serve to foster greater economic mobility and to enhance the prospects for Chinese American children to prepare to enter the most prestigious American educational institutions. Min Zhou and Xiyuan Li show that these schools, joint ventures between community leaders, entrepreneurs, parents, and children, have changed with time and have reflected differing historical realities. However, while in both periods they have contributed to the debate over how they might incorporate into American society, in the earlier phase they represented far more the immigrants' desire to resist integration, motivated by a sojourner mentality. In recent years they have stressed cultural preservation but not at the expense of seeking incorporation into American society.

In "The Importance of Being Italian," Timothy Meagher ventures into the area of representation and the ways in which the popular arts, in this case mainstream movies, reflect the ethnic landscape of America. Starting in the 1960s, moviegoers began to see a substantial number of films depicting Italian Americans. Before that time Italians rarely captured the interest of filmmakers, so audiences had few opportunities to "meet" immigrants from Italy and their descendants on the big screen. But from the 1960s to the 1990s, film after film, some of them such blockbusters as the *Godfather* trilogy, explored the details of Italian American ethnicity. In

fact, during these decades Americans of Italian descent emerged as the quintessential “ethnics,” the stand-in for white Americans who maintained a connection to some place of European origin and who seemed different enough to be interesting, even exotic, yet could be recognizable to all Americans.

Italians came to represent a degree of primitivism without being frightening. They venerated family in these movies and operated according to a code of honor that made them disdainful of bureaucracy and the formal trappings of the state. According to Meagher, the wildly popular movies and widespread diffusion of certain stock images of cinematic Italian Americans fit well into the culture of America during the last decades of the twentieth century, indirectly contributing to Italian Americans’ efforts to gain greater acceptance in mainstream American society.

Why, he asks, did this change occur, and how did Italian Americans move from the relative obscurity of the earlier era to the widespread prominence of this later period? What was it about Italian Americans that served the interest of filmmakers, producers, studios, and the American public in the decades after the 1960s as they explored certain aspects of ethnicity?

Meagher indicates that other groups would not as effectively serve what was essentially an exploration of a counter-American image but ultimately a safe one. The Irish had been in America too long to seem different, while Poles and other East Europeans lacked widespread recognition or familiarity to most Americans. Jews lacked the association with the primitive and if anything were portrayed as overly cerebral and overly civilized. Thus the stupendously popular and then constantly repeated image of the Italian American as *the* ethnic had little to do with “real” Italian Americans and much to do with the nature of American culture in these years. Nevertheless, despite the differences between the cinematic and the actual Italian Americans, the overall effect of the former was to add certain favorable attributes to the latter without their initiative (e.g., appreciation of food, family, passion for life), enhancing their efforts to further their integration.

Indeed, the implication here is that as a consequence of the popular media Italian Americans were invited into mainstream America on terms very much linked to their perceived representation of traditional values of family and community as well as to the manner in which their cinematic characters captured America’s frustration, despair, and sense of impotence with politicians and officeholders. Thus this mantle of respectability and

legitimacy remained a media-generated phenomenon that was actually at variance with the real profile of contemporary Italian Americans. Their incorporation, therefore, was not unqualified but very much an unusual work in progress.

Finally, “The Importance of Being Italian” goes beyond the issue of how American film makers represented “Italianness” and why American audience responded positively to particular themes. Meagher speculates on the ways in which America’s most recent immigrants may or may not become incorporated into the nation through popular culture images. New immigrant groups are very likely to become the subjects of films and other works, and those works, to be consumed by large numbers of Americans, could become part of the newcomers’ process of incorporation. However, for Italians the projection of the cinematic images took place long after their principal immigration had ended and Italians had ceased to be defined as a problem. For the newest immigrants, on the other hand, this media-related process has begun while their immigration continues unabated, constituting for many Americans a serious social concern. In essence, Americans may in part “meet” the newest immigrants on the screen. How this will affect their representation and, consequently, their incorporation remains to be seen.

Given that the incorporation of immigrants is profoundly affected by the context of reception in the receiving society, Gary Gerstle’s “The Immigrant as Threat to American Security: A Historical Perspective” offers a valuable, sweeping overview of Americans’ fears of immigrants and immigration in both the past and the present. It takes as its time frame nearly all of American history, going back to the early nineteenth century and moving forward to the most recent years, the period defined largely by the attacks at the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.

Gerstle balances four historically recurrent themes as he seeks to understand how and when Americans worried about immigrants and the threat they posed to American life. He describes four axes of American concern: immigrants’ perceived threats to American security in terms of religion, politics, economics, and race. The central issue involves the repeated ways in which Americans have identified immigrants as religiously, politically, economically, and racially subversive. Implicit here in terms of our theme is the way those responses have adversely affected newcomers’ efforts to gradually gain access to American society. Depictions of immigrants’ subversion, in both rhetoric and policy, reflected an American ideology that held up, differently at different times, a belief that America had

to remain a white, Protestant nation, committed to a capitalist economic order, and based on a republican ideal.

Various eras usually produced distinct fears directed at particular groups. Those fears inspired specific policies to address the anticipated immigrant threat and stimulated hostile imagery and violent mob action. American anxieties especially flourished during times of unrest and wars because their aftermaths proved to be particularly fertile ground for making Americans feel insecure. In effect, accusations made against immigrant groups can serve (and have served) to significantly delay their integration into mainstream American society. In addition, because immigrants are seen in some respects as markedly different, they are also perceived as a threat. If not pressured to depart, as an expression of these various motives, the newcomers are certainly kept, in social and political terms, at arm's length, denied the essential opportunities to incorporate into American society.

In other words, confronted with changed circumstances that they were struggling to understand, Americans had at hand a convenient focus: the immigrant threat, whether to America's religious core, its racial purity, its economic livelihood, or to its political order. Immigrants provided handy exemplars of all that had gone wrong, and targeting them seemed a reasonable way to address the new and troubling realities. The recurrence of this pattern makes it clear that the past and present can and ought to be considered in tandem. We can expect that the earlier difficulties experienced by immigrants seeking acceptance in America will be encountered by new groups in the future—if they are not being encountered already.

The essay by sociologists Anny Bakalian and Mehdi Bozorgmehr draws on both history and contemporary affairs as it explores the ways the United States has defined itself as a nation under attack and how that perception has connected to fears of immigrants and other foreigners. Here is an example of how scholars primarily concerned with recent events can use history. The reaction of the U.S. government in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, had precedents, and Bakalian and Bozorgmehr argue persuasively that to understand how the government, and public opinion more generally, made sense of the recent crisis scholars should look to the past.

Bakalian and Bozorgmehr give to those concentrating on the contemporary scene several historical examples that they assert should be referred to and understood. They illustrate not only how certain groups could be singled out and further marginalized because of tumultuous domestic and

foreign events but also how precarious the quest for incorporation could become in the face of such crises as war and domestic unrest. They take as their first past event the massive campaign launched both at the policy level and through popular outrage stirred up against Germans and German Americans during World War I. In that early-twentieth-century example, they show, we can see all the developments that occurred in the wake of September 11 as the state and the populace seethed with anger at Middle Easterners and South Asians who found themselves in the United States. Likewise, these two scholars suggest that scholars and others concerned with contemporary reactions to the sense of threat from the outside that the events of the fall of 2001 inspired should look back to the Palmer Raids, a response to the “Red Scare” that gripped the United States in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the wave of strikes that swept through the United States in 1919. Finally, the experiences of Japanese Americans (as opposed to the Issei, Japanese aliens), American born and as such American citizens, following the attack on Pearl Harbor and America’s entry into World War II, can provide precedents for thinking about the present.

Because Bakalian and Bozorgmehr have provided historical material here, they are asking an essentially comparative question. How did the reactions of the state and the public in 2001 differ from what had been manifested during World War I, the Red Scare, and World War II? What similarities link the past with the present, and how can the similarities and differences be explained? And what do such examples reveal about the dilemmas that minorities (both white European and nonwhite) face in terms of reconciling their desire to preserve traditional cultures, beliefs, and even homeland ties with their desire to be accepted by mainstream society? Those who have marginal political beliefs and/or are associated with a nation in conflict with the United States could find their security and rights seriously jeopardized.

Our collection concludes with Roger Waldinger’s critique of uses of the concept of “transnationalism” that imply that ties to homelands are a relatively recent innovation. He contends that the phenomenon “scholars call ‘transnationalism’ is fundamentally mislabeled and misunderstood.” He sees such activities as “long-distance particularism” not unlike what took place among earlier immigrants. Yet although he discusses the historical parallels for what is now identified as transnationalism, he also notes the contrasts. Especially important is the impact of nation-states today in ways that introduce international uncertainties into such “global

interconnections.” Moreover, loyalties that transcend borders have often been viewed by the public—with some misgivings—as dual attachments. Implicit in his discussion is also the recognition that many immigrants do not preserve the strong ties identified with transnationalism but have moved toward more limited, periodic contacts—what Barkan has labeled “translocalism.”

Furthermore, Waldinger’s analysis of the immigrants’ social networks and “transborder bilocalism,” as juxtaposed to “intrastate bilocalism,” raises a number of issues related to the intersections of migration, nation-states, and boundary maintenance and control. The incorporation of newcomers is significantly affected not only by the attitudes and needs of the immigrants but also by nation-state mechanisms that control international migration and the admission of new immigrants. Whatever proponents of transnationalism may argue about “deterritorialization” arising from immigrants’ dual loyalties ignores the ongoing presence of elaborate sovereign state controls, which have “increased significantly between the last age of mass migration and today’s.” In the final analysis, because immigrants are perceived as “internal aliens,” there is the latent threat of their being viewed as suspect, making their “long-distance nationalism . . . a hazardous game.” Immigrants especially eager to integrate into mainstream society frequently recognize the potential drawbacks of remaining too tightly (and too visibly) wedded to their homelands and make adjustments and compromises to facilitate their incorporation into American society. Their children, especially those born in America and less intimately familiar with their parents’ homeland, will commonly move ahead more readily with their own integration.

NOTES

1. Rachel L. Swarns, “Immigrant Groups Plan Campaign to Bring Legal Changes,” *New York Times*, April 20, 2006; David Montgomery, “A Banner Day on the Mall,” *Washington Post*, April 11, 2006.

2. “While Paris Burns,” editorial, *New York Times*, November 8, 2005.

3. Hassan M. Fattah, “Anger Burns on the Fringe of Britain’s Muslims,” *New York Times*, July 16, 2005; Sarah Lyall, “Lost in Bombings, Diverse and Promising Lives,” *New York Times*, July 17, 2005; Nina Bernstein, “In American Cities, No Mirror Image of Muslims of Leeds,” *New York Times*, July 21, 2005.

4. Peter Roberts, *The New Immigration: A Study of the Industrial and Social Life of Southeastern Europeans in America* (New York: Macmillan, 1912).

5. Edward Alsworth Ross, *The Old World in the New: The Significance of Past and Present Immigration to the American People* (New York: Century, 1914), 285.
6. Madison Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race* (New York: Scribner's, 1916), 18.
7. Franz Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man* (New York: Macmillan, 1911).
8. Franz Boas, "Changes in Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants," in *Reports of the Immigration Commission*, 61st Cong., 2nd sess., Senate Document No. 208 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1911), vol. 38.
9. Quoted in Ruth Benedict, *Race: Politics and Science* (New York: Viking Press, 1945), 195–96, and in Eric L. Goldstein, *The Price of Whiteness: Jews, Race, and American Identity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 193.
10. Goldstein, *Price of Whiteness*, 193.
11. "American Anthropological Association Statement on 'Race,'" May 17, 1998, www.aaanet.org/stmts/racepp.htm.
12. Herbert Baxter Adams, "The Germanic Origin of New England Towns. With Notes on Cooperation in University Work," *Johns Hopkins University Studies*, 1st ser., 2 (1882): 1. Also discussed by Peter Novick in *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 87–88.
13. Frederick Jackson Turner, quoted in Ray Allen Billington, *Frederick Jackson Turner: Historian, Scholar, Teacher* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 171.
14. Frederick J. Turner, *The United States, 1830–1850: The Nation and Its Sections* (New York: P. Smith, 1935), 286.
15. Marcus Lee Hansen, *The Immigrant in American History*, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1940).
16. Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations That Made the American People* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951).
17. An excellent anthology on incorporation that includes the work of social scientists and historians is Peter Kivisto, ed., *Incorporating Diversity: Rethinking Assimilation in a Multicultural Age* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2005). See also Werner Sollors, ed., *Theories of Ethnicity: A Classical Reader* (New York: New York University Press, 1996).
18. Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White* (New York: Routledge, 1995); Alexander Saxton, *The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); David Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (New York: Verso, 1991) and *Towards the Abolition of Whiteness: Essays on Race, Politics, and Working Class History* (New York: Verso, 1994). Scholars dealing with other immigrant groups and the whiteness issue include historian Thomas A. Guglielmo, *White on Arrival: Italians, Race, Color, and Power in Chicago, 1890–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), and anthropologist Karen Brodtkin,

How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says about Race in America (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994).

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20. David R. Roediger, *Working toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White* (New York: Basic Books, 2005).

21. Alan M. Kraut, *The Huddled Masses: The Immigrant in American Society, 1880–1921*, 2nd ed. (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 2001), 17.

22. John Bodnar, *The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 1–56.

23. On return migration, see Mark Wyman, *Roundtrip to America: The Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880–1930* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). Italian return migration is treated in Betty Boyd Caroli, *Italian Repatriation from the United States, 1900–1914* (Staten Island, NY: Center for Migration Studies, 1973), and Dino Cinel, *The National Integration of Italian Return Migration, 1870–1929* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

24. See Josef J. Barton's description of this predeparture process in *Peasants and Strangers, Italians, Rumanians, and Slovaks in an American City, 1890–1950* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 64–90.

25. Letter to the editor of the *Jewish Daily Forward*, 1930, in *A Bintel Brief: Sixty Years of Letters from the Lower East Side to the Jewish Daily Forward*, ed. Isaac Metzker (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), 148–50.

26. Stephen Henderson, “Rakhi Dhanoa and Ranjeet Purewal,” *New York Times*, August 18, 2002, reprinted in David A. Gerber and Alan M. Kraut, *American Immigration and Ethnicity: A Reader* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 124–25.

27. Jane Addams, *Twenty Years at Hull House* (New York: Macmillan, 1910).

28. Peter Brimelow, “Time to Rethink Immigration?” *National Review*, June 22, 1992, 30–46, and *Alien Nation: Common Sense about America's Immigration Disaster* (New York: Random House, 1995).

29. Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenge to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).

30. Sarah Kershaw, “Freud Meets Buddha: Therapy for Immigrants,” *New York Times*, January 18, 2003, reprinted in Gerber and Kraut, *American Immigration*, 297–99. For a fuller discussion of health institutions and their response to immigrants, see Alan M. Kraut, *Silent Travelers: Germs, Genes, and the “Immigrant Menace”* (New York: Basic Books, 1994).

31. An excellent discussion of immigrant letters is to be found in David A. Gerber, *Authors of Their Lives: The Personal Correspondence of British Immigrants to North America in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: New York University Press, 2006).

32. Deborah Sontag and Celia W. Dugger, “The New Immigrant Tide: A Shuttle between Worlds,” *New York Times*, July 19, 1998.

33. Alejandro Portes describes the conditions that affect the ability of individuals to participate in transnationalism. See Alejandro Portes, "Conclusion: Theoretical Contingencies and Empirical Evidence in the Study of Immigrant Transnationalism," *International Migration Review* 37 (Fall 2003): 879, and Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut, *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 46–49.

34. *Afroyim vs. Rusk*, 387 US 253 (1967).

35. Philip Kasinitz, John H. Mollenkopf, and Mary C. Waters, "Worlds of the Second Generation," in *Becoming New Yorkers: Ethnographies of the New Second Generation* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004), 4.

36. Elliott R. Barkan, "Race, Religion and Nationality in American Society: A Model of Ethnicity—From Contact to Assimilation," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 14 (Winter 1995): 49, reprinted in Kivisto, *Incorporating Diversity*, 190–91; Portes, "Conclusion," 877.

37. Barkan, "Race, Religion," 54–58, reprinted in Kivisto, *Incorporating Diversity*, 194–98.

38. Peter Kivisto, "The Revival of Assimilation in Historical Perspective," in Kivisto, *Incorporating Diversity*, 5–14.

39. *Ibid.*, 25.

40. Peggy Levitt, Josh DeWind, and Steven Vertovec, "International Perspectives on Transnational Migration: An Introduction," *International Migration Review* 37 (Fall 2003): 567–71.

41. Reed Ueda, "Historical Patterns of Immigrant Status and Incorporation in the United States," in *E Pluribus Unum? Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation*, ed. Gary Gerstle and John Mollenkopf (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), 305.

42. Herbert Hoover preferred the use of administrative procedures by consular officials of the State Department to returning to Congress for even more restrictive legislation in the early 1930s. See Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut, *American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933–1945* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 11–51.

43. Ueda, "Historical Patterns," 313.

44. Mae M. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

45. These movements had to adapt to gain mainstream legitimacy, and this continues to be true for more recent cases. Kivisto, in "Revival of Assimilation," echoes Will Kymlicka's observation in *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) that there are four prerequisites for the functioning and integration of a multicultural society, the ground rules that specific groups as well as mainstream society must accept. These are "public spiritedness," a "sense of justice," "civility and tolerance," and a "shared sense of solidarity or loyalty." Most recently, American Muslims

have been pressed to demonstrate their commitment to these four principles in the wake of the September 11 attack on New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Specifically, Muslims living in the United States have been expected by their non-Muslim neighbors to explicitly disavow violence toward nonbelievers as a legitimate aspect of Islamic teachings. In July 2005, following the bombings in London, the Muslim community in the United States did issue a *fatwa* condemning extremism and violence against civilians. See Laurie Goodstein, "From Muslims in America, a New Fatwa on Terrorism," *New York Times*, July 28, 2005.

46. U.S. Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security, *2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics* (Washington, DC: U.S. Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security, September 2004), table 2, and Jeffrey Passel, "Estimates of the Size and Characteristics of the Undocumented Population," Pew Hispanic Center, March 21, 2005, 1, www.migrationinformation.org (under "New Resources") (accessed April 18, 2005).

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48. This translocalism model is developed by Elliott R. Barkan in "America in the Hand, Homeland in the Heart: Transnational and Translocal Immigrant Experiences in the American West," *Western Historical Quarterly* 35 (Autumn 2004): 335–41.

49. Portes, "Conclusion," 876–77. See also Kivisto, "Revival of Assimilation," 23.

50. On public opinion, see Elliott R. Barkan, "Return of the Nativists? California Public Opinion and Immigration in the 1980s and 1990s," *Social Science History* 27 (Summer 2003): 229–83, and David M. Reimers, *Unwelcome Strangers: American Identity and the Turn against Immigration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

51. Nicholas Ricardi, "Judge Rules Students Can Stay in U.S.," *Los Angeles Times*, October 22, 2005.

52. Richard Alba and Victor Nee, *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 271–91.

53. Steven A. Camarota, "Economy Slowed, but Immigrants Didn't: The Foreign-Born Population, 2004," Washington, DC, Center for Migration Studies, November 2004, 1, www.cis.org/articles/2004/back1204.html.

54. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*, 264.