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case you lock yourself out. On the other hand, if you were being prosecuted by the government and were using email to communicate with your lawyer, knowing the government couldn't get a copy of your key might be awfully important. That's why privacy campaigners feel so strongly that escrow should be voluntary, not mandatory--an argument that gains some force from the fact that encryption software spreads across the Net faster than politicians can argue.
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The other big issue, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) that restrict
exports of strong encryption, can't be argued fast enough for American software
companies, all of whom would love to be able to build encryption into their
business-oriented products. It's a measure of the general air of official provincialism
that, when the two spokesmen the White House threw to the CFP'94 wolves were
asked by reporters about this, their answer was, "Well, the domestic market is
pretty big." Two years later, Nelson followed this up by saying that the companies'
complaints showed that the export controls were having precisely the effect they
were intended to have: "Keeping cryptography from where we don't want it to go."
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Did these guys really not know that even in 1993, 40 percent of the revenues of a
company the size and dominance of Lotus (at the time Microsoft's chief competitor)
came from Europe? Lotus, then two years away from big losses and acquisition by
IBM, was betting its future on the groupware product Notes, which uses encryption
to protect the confidentiality of the company-wide databases it helps generate.
Encryption has a place in business in everything from fileservers to databases and
word processors as well as email, and European companies are if anything more
security-minded and suspicious than American companies. Does the U.S.
government really think Europeans will tamely settle for whatever encryption it
decides is weak enough to export, especially when they have access to top-notch
cryptographers like the Israelis (including Adi Shamir, co-formulator of the RSA
algorithm) and respected algorithms like IDEA being developed in places like
Switzerland?
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These export controls arguably have given companies in the rest of the world the
chance to compete in and even dominate a market that otherwise might have gone
to American companies by default. If they haven't succeeded, it's because U.S.
dominance of office software makes integrating cryptography a problem. A May
1996 government report, "Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society"
(CRISIS),[3] ended up agreeing with the things the Net had been
saying for years: "Export controls also have had the effect of reducing the domestic
availability of products with strong encryption capabilities. The need for US vendors
(especially software vendors) to market their products to an international audience
leads many of them to weaken the encryption capabilities of products available to
the domestic market, even though no statutory restrictions are imposed on that
market." The reason: it's too expensive to support two versions of every product. Nonetheless, the report recommended that export controls should not be
eliminated, only that they should be "progressively relaxed."[4]
Interestingly enough, by late October 1996, European companies were equally
unhappy about the American restrictions, and the European Electronic Messaging
Association began lobbying the European Commission in Brussels to improve
matters both by harmonizing European legislation and by negotiating with the
United States to lift restrictions on access to the software developer kits that allow
third parties to integrate encryption into the market-leading business office software
such as that produced by Microsoft.
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Encryption is just as controversial outside the United States, though not as publicly
debated. France, the most often cited example of a repressive regime,
cryptographically speaking, requires anyone using cryptography to obtain a license.
Japan tightened its export regulations in September 1996 to require businesses to
get prior government approval for any overseas order of encryption products worth
more than 50,000 yen (about $450), way down from 10 million yen (about
$91,000). However, RSA announced earlier that summer that its Japanese affiliate
would shortly begin selling a triple-DES chip stronger than U.S. companies were
allowed to export, a move critics felt vindicated their stance against the U.S.
government's regulations. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), too, spent much of 1996 talking about developing a network
of trusted third parties to hold keys in escrow; however, its draft guidelines of
  
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